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By WILLIAM D. WHITEMAN
Member of the Class of 1981
INTRODUCTION
Natural gas is a major source of energy in North America but is
not often located near the point of demand or consumption and must
be transported to where it can be used. This transportation usually is
accomplished by pressurizing the gas to move it through pipelines.
There are 263,000 miles' of natural gas transmission pipelines2 in the
United States and there is also an extensive network of these pipelines
in Canada. Although pipeline transportation is relatively safe, acci-
dents occur3 and the potential for damage is high.4
This high potential for damage might be realized in an accident
involving a large diameter pipeline transporting natural gas at high
1. 10 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. NATURAL GA PIPELINE SAFETY ACT ANN. REP. i
(1977).
2. One definition of a transmission line is that it is a "pipeline, other than a gathering
line, that (a) transports gas from a gathering line or storage facility to a distribution center or
storage facility, (b) operates at a hoop stress of 20 percent or more of SMYS; or (c) transports
gas within a storage field." 49 C.F.R. § 192.3 (1979). Definitions of most of these terms will
also be found at 49 C.F.R. § 192.3 (1979).
3. There were 466 failures involving transmission and gathering lines in 1977 which
were reported to the Department of Transportation. 10 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSp. NATURAL
GAS PIPELINE SAFETY ACT ANN. REP., supra note 1, at 3.
4. Extensive personal and property damage is common in accidents involving gas
transmission pipelines. For two examples see, NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSP., PIPELINE ACCIDENT REP. No. 75-3, S. UNION GAS Co. GA TRANsMISSION PIPE-
LINE-FAILURE NEAR FARMINGTON, N.M. 1 (1974); NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., U.S. DEP'T
OF TRANSP., PIPELINE ACCIDENT REP. No. 76-7, SUN PIPELINE Co. RUPTURE OF EIGHT-
INCH PIPELINE, ROMULUS, MICH. 1 (1975). Although most court decisions in both the
United States and Canada refer to distribution lines or mains, the application of thes case
to transmission lines poses no theoretical problems as distribution and transmission pipe-
lines carrying natural gas expose people to hazards of the same type.
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pressure. Such lines are common in both the United States and Ca-
nada.
This note compares the liability of the operator of a natural gas
transmission line in the United States to one in Canada for a typical
accident. One of the first issues to be addressed in the event of an acci-
dent would be the determination of the theory of liability under which
an action might be brought against the operator of the pipeline. Here,
liability is reviewed in terms of the applicable statutes, regulations and
common law. Relevant United States statutes and regulations are re-
viewed and compared with the pertinent Canadian statutes and regula-
tions, primarily those of Alberta which is Canada's major energy
producing province. Due to the relative scarcity and narrow scope of
regulations and statutes pertinent to liability, the emphasis of this note
is on common law liability. Within this broad area this note chrono-
logically reviews United States cases brought under negligence and
strict liability theories. Canadian common law is then discussed chron-
ologically and comparatively, emphasizing its distinctive features,
From this comparison, this note concludes that if an accident occurred
on non-Federal lands in the United States an action would be brought
under a negligence theory, whereas if it occurred in Canada, an action
would be brought under a strict liability theory.
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA
While there are some United States Federal statutes and regula-
tions pertaining specifically to liability, they have been in existence
only a short time5 and are surprisingly narrow in scope. Regulations6
written under the authority of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920,7 as
amended, delineate the liability of a gas transmission line operator for
damage or injury incurred by the United States in connection with cer-
tain rights-of-way or temporary use permits8 granted through Federal
lands.9 The holder of the right-of-way or use permit may be held
strictly liable for activities determined to present a "foreseeable hazard
5. Regulations, which were authorized by a 1973 amendment to the Mineral Leasing
Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978) were not promulgated until late 1979.
See, 44 Fed. Reg. 58, 126 (1979) (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 2880).
6. 44 Fed. Reg. 58, 126 (1979) (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. §§ 2880 et Seq).
7. 30 U.S.C. § 185(f) (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
8. 44 Fed. Reg. 58, 126; 58, 130 (1979) (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 2880.0-7).
9. 44 Fed. Reg. 58, 126; 58, 130 (1979) (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 2880.0-5(e)),
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or risk of damage to the United States."' 0 The extent of liability is
however limited so as to be "commensurate with the foreseeable risks
or hazards presented"'1 and in no case may it exceed $1,000,000.12
Damages in excess of $1,000,000 are determined according to negli-
gence concepts. 13 These regulations also state that holders of rights-of-
way or use permits are "fully liable for injuries or damages to third
parties resulting from activities or facilities on lands under Federal ju-
risdiction."' 4 Such liability is to be determined in accordance with the
law of the jurisdiction where the incident occurs.' s
Another Federal statute' 6 closely related to pipeline accidents
states that it shall not "affect the common law or statutory tort liability
of any person."' 7 Regulations promulgated under this statute' 8 empha-
size the safety aspects of the design, construction, operation and main-
tenance of certain pipelines. At least one court has indicated that these
regulations are not clear.' 9 Thus, United States regulations which deal
directly with liability are very limited in scope and apply only to pipe-
lines through certain Federal lands. There are other Federal regula-
tions close to the subject of pipeline accidents, but they are of
questionable clarity and expressly do not affect liability.
In Canada, Federal energy activities are centered in the National
Energy Board (NEB) and the Ministry of Energy Mines and Re-
sources.2" NEB authority over pipelines does not extend to matters of
liability but is limited to several broad areas including requirement of
preconstruction Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, ex-
10. 44 Fed. Reg. 58, 126; 58, 134-35 (1979) (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 2883.1-4(b).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. 44 Fed. Reg. 58,126, 58,134-35 (1979) (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 2883.1-4(d)).
15. Id.
16. Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1686 (1976 & Supp. I1
1978).
17. Id. § 1677(d).
18. Regulations for the Transportation of Natural and Other Gas by Pipeline, 49 C.F.R.
§§ 191-192 (1979).
19. In Karle v. Natural Gas Distrib. Corp., 448 F.Supp. 753 (W.D. Pa. 1978), the plain-
tiff was injured when defendant's 20 inch gas main leaked causing an explosion in the bank
where plaintiff worked- The court stated "[a]lthough [defendant] has arguably violated two
of these regulations, neither regulation so clearly applies... that we can base liability upon
its alleged violation." Id. at 767. And it was noted that "[w]hen read together, 192.463(a)
and 192A65 present an ambiguous statement. . . " Id. at 768.
20. See OFFICE OF INT'L AFFAIRS U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, THE ROLE OF FOREION
GOVERNMEN-TS IN THE ENERGY INDDUST-RIES 36 (1977). The NEB was created by the Na-
tional Energy Board Act, Can. Stat. 1959, c. 46. The Ministry of Energy is limited to coordi-
nating and policy making activities whereas the NEB is a regulatory body.
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propriation powers, leave of the NEB before commencement of opera-
tions, and regulation of tolls and tariffs.21 Thus, Canada has no
Federal statutes and regulations pertaining to liability.
Under the British North American Act of 186722 natural resources
are controlled by individual provinces23 and thus resources not moved
outside provincial boundaries seem to be subject only to provincial reg-
ulation.24 While each province has some statutes pertaining to pipe-
lines, 25 only Alberta, which produces about 85 percent of Canada's gas
and oil,26 seems to have specific regulations which affect liability. For
example, Section 26(2) of the Special Areas Pipe Line Regulations 27
states that the operator will be liable for all damage, and Section 27(2)
of the Public Lands Pipe Regulations2" makes a similar statement.
United States and Canadian Federal statutes and regulations are
then similar to the extent neither deals with liability on non-Federal
lands. While the United States regulations assign strict liability for ac-
cidents on Federal lands, Alberta provincial regulations also state oper-
ators are liable for all damage where pipelines are on public lands or in
special areas. Thus, in most situations in each country the law regard-
ing liability for pipeline accidents is to be found in the case law.
COMMON LAW THEORIES OF LIABILITY IN THE UNITED
STATES
Negligence
The cases in most United States jurisdictions proceed on a negli-
gence theory with the standard of care adjusted to obtain the desired
result. One of the first United States cases to openly acknowledge the
adjustment of the standard of care was Sipple v. Laclede Gaslight Coln-
pany.29 In that case, the plaintiff sued for the wrongful death of his
father, who allegedly was asphyxiated by gas from defendant's leaking
21. Acorn, Petroleum Supplement, 3 ALTA. L. REv. 367, 372 (1964). The reader is di-
rected to this article for a general discussion of Canadian governmental issues related to
pipelines.
22. British North American Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
23. OFFICE OF INT'L AFFAIRS U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 20, at 36.
24. See Acorn, supra note 21, at 377-81, 389-92 for a general discussion.
25. See, e.g., Gas Pipe Line Act, MAN. REV. STAT. 1970, c. 1'70; The Pipe Lines Act,
SASK. REv. STAT. 1965, c. 413; The Pipe Line Act. B.C. REv. STAT. 1960, c. 284; The Pipe
Line Act, 1975, ALTA. STAT. 1975(2) c. 30.
26. See OFFICE OF INT'L AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 20, at 43.
27. Alta. Reg. 13/59.
28. Alta. Reg. 246/58 as amended by Alta. Regs. 91/59, 79/61, 264/61 and 251/64,
29. 125 Mo. App. 81, 102 S.W. 608 (1907).
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gas main. The court noted that the burden of proving lack of due care
devolved upon the plaintiff and that the plaintiff had not sustained his
burden because he had failed to introduce direct proof showing a lack
of due care.3" The Sipple court acknowledged, however, that with re-
gard to escaping gas, the burden of proving lack of due care was "much
relaxed"3 and that the requirement of ordinary care was "adjusted. " 32
The court in Sipple thus openly acknowledged the adjustment of the
standard of care.
Some cases of this period which adjusted or allowed flexibility in
the standard of care used methods different than Sople's frank recogni-
tion of the adjustment. One method was to allow jury instructions
granting wide discretion on issues other than liability, but which di-
rectly affected liability. This flexibility was demonstrated in the case of
Barrickman v. Marion Oil Company.33 There, defendant's gas line was
over-pressured when plaintiffs regulator failed and admitted high pres-
sure gas to plaintiffs appliances, causing them to explode. Plaintiffs
house was destroyed in an ensuing fire. The Barrickman court ap-
proved jury instructions relating the standard of care to the degree of
danger involved and allowed the jury to decide the degree of danger
from the evidence. The jury found gas to be an "extremely dangerous
substance."34 Thus, the court allowed the jury the flexibility to increase
the standard of care based on the jury's determination of the degree of
danger. This effectively increases the standard of care as the jury is
likely to be sympathetic to the plaintiff in situations in which natural
gas is involved.
At least one case from this period restricted the defendant's stan-
dard of care to a level approaching ordinary care. This case, Trple
State Natural Gas and Oil Company v. Wellman," is however, distin-
guishable from Siople and Barrickman, supra, on its facts. In Trple
State, the plaintiff was on the premises of a third party who had control
and possession of a gas meter which was owned by the defendant. The
third party accidently turned the wrong valve at the meter allowing
high pressure gas from defendant's main to enter the meter. The meter
exploded and injured the plaintiff. The primary factual difference is
30. Id. at 610.
31. Id. at 611.
32. Id. The court further noted that absent an intervening agent, proof of a break or
leak from which gas escapes and presumably causes the loss was sufficient to sustain a jury's
inference of negligence. Id.
33. 45 W. Va. 634, 32 S.E. 327 (1898).
34. Id. at 330-31.
35. 114 Ky. 79, 70 S.W. 49 (1902).
No. 3]
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that in Spple and Barrickman, supra, the instrumentality was in the
control of the defendant, whereas in Triole State the instrumentality
was in the control of a third party. Since there was a culpable third
party, the court had little reason to find the defendanit liable. In order
to exonerate the defendant the court chose a lower standard of care
than that used in Siople and Barrickman, supra. This lower standard of
care is shown by the Trple State court's statement that the defendant is
"bound. . . to exercise such care. . . as the dangerous character...
[of gas]. . . demand[s] of a person of ordinaryprudence.'' 36 This stan-
dard, although it refers to the dangerous character of gas, is a lower
standard than that in Siple and Barrickman, supra.
The more recent decisions also reflect the same flexibility or ad-
justment of the standard of care in allowing for the desired recovery as
seen in Spple, Barrickman, and Tr~vle State, supra. For example, in
Gas Consumers' Association v. Lely, 37 the court stated that the defend-
ant was "bound to exercise such care, skill, and diligence . . . as the
difficulty, delicacy, and danger of [gas] requires." 38 In Skelly Oil Coln-
pany v. Holloway3 9 the court noted that "[i]n view of the highly danger-
ous character of the gas. . . a distributor of gas. . . must use a degree
of care . . . commensurate with the danger of risk . ... -4 A 1978
case, Karle v. National Fuel Gas Distribution Corporation,4' also adheres
to this view. There it is stated that "[iln delimiting the duty of care of
gas . . . companies, . . . courts have emphasized the extreme danger
.... [And] . . . . upon their purveyors the law imposes the 'highest
standard of care practicable' . [citations]. 42
These cases indicate that courts have recognized the dangerous na-
ture of gas and have employed a flexible or adjustable standard of care
to allow for the desired result. The adjustment has usually been to in-
crease the standard of care due to the dangers involved. In some situa-
tions, however, the courts have reverted to what is essentially the
ordinary care standard to protect worthy defendants. That is, in some
situations, such as Trple State, supra, the dangerous nature of gas has
36. Id. at 51 (emphasis added).
37. 57 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1932). Gas Consumer's was an asphyxiation case.
38. Id. at 397.
39. 171 F.2d 670 (8th Cir. 1948). In Skelly a fire occurred in plaintiffs house as a result
of a leak in defendant's gas main.
40. Id. at 674.
41. 448 F.Supp. 753 (W.D. Pa. 1978). See note 19 supra for a discussion of the factual
situation.
42. Id. at 759.
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not influenced the court and a person transporting gas has been held to
act only as a person of ordinary prudence.
Strict Liability
Another theory of liability which has been employed in United
States courts is strict liability. Perhaps the best discussion of the efforts
to hold an operator strictly liable is in the early case of Gould Y. Winona
Gas Company. 43
In Gould, plaintiff's trees allegedly were damaged by the escape of
gas from defendant's gas mains. The lower court ruled for the defend-
ant and plaintiff appealed from an order denying a new trial. Plaintiff
contended the rules of negligence did not govern the case but that the
principle of Rylands v. Fletcher' applied. That is, that defendants were
strictly liable4 - for their acts. The Minnesota Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that the principle of strict liability had been applied in the state46
but stated that the application had been limited to things whose "natu-
ral tendency. . . was to become a nuisance or to do mischief if they
escape."'47 The court reviewed the arguments other jurisdictions had
used to deny application of strict liability principles. The main argu-
ments were "that pipes have carried gas away from the company's own
land '48 and "that the gas company is a public service corporation en-
gaged in furnishing an essential of modem city life."49 The Gould
court rejected the first argument against application of strict liability by
noting that the ground where the pipe was laid was company property
for the purpose of transporting gas;50 the latter argument against appli-
cation of strict liability was rejected by noting that the activity was a
voluntary undertaking for profit.
Gould went on to discuss many cases requiring that negligence be
shown to establish liability and concluded that
43. 111 N.W. 254 (Minn. 1907).
44. L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868). This case found defendants to be liable for damages when
water in a reservoir they had constructed escaped into an abandoned coal mine. Defendants
were free from all personal blame, but were nonetheless found liable. This decision is the
basis of the doctrine of strict liability.
45. The terms strict liability and absolute liability are not distinguished in this Note.
46. Gould v. Winona Gas Co., I 1l N.W. 254, 254.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 255. One interpretation of Rylands v. Fletcher requires the object to escape
from the defendant's land. This statement thus implies that since the object is not on the
defendant's land to begin with, Rylands v. Fletcher does not apply.
49. Id.
50. This statement seems to refer to the fact that the company had an easement in which
to lay its pipe.
No. :3]
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[i]t is evident that the ultimate justification of the inapplicability of
the rule of [strict liability] to cases of damage by gas escaping from
mains lies . . [not in] . . . doctrine, but [in] common sense. [The
common law's] claim to distinction is to be found not in [its] logical
consistency. . . but in [its] practical wisdom. . . . Finally, it is to
be observed that the severity of the rule of [strict] liability . . . is
opposed to the unmistakable tendency of the law. . . to rest respon-
sibility. . . upon legal culpability. 5'
Thus, Gould's denial of strict liability was based on common sense
rather than legal analysis or reasoning.
Since the Gould decision appeared in 1907, United States law gov-
erning strict liability has. undergone an evolution. A further explora-
tion of strict liability in the United States is therefore appropriate. It
has been mentioned in some cases even though it has not been explic-
itly pled. In Di Sandro v. Providence Gas Company 2 a gas leak devel-
oped in a distribution main that apparently had been disturbed by
recent sewer construction. The gas found its way into plaintiff's house,
which was destroyed by an explosion when plaintiff entered his gas
filled basement with a lantern. The court noted in dicta that a gas com-
pany "is not an insurer."'53 Another case where strict liability was men-
tioned was Skelly Oil Company v. Holloway, supra, where the court also
concluded that the defendant was not an insurer.54 The Minnesota
Supreme Court in De Vries v. City ofAustin"S discussed Gould and then
rejected the idea of a gas distributor as an "insurer of the safety of its
operations."56 A iecent case in which the plaintiff pled strict liability is
Karle v. National Fuel Gas Distribution Corporation, supra. There, de-
fendant's 20 inch gas main leaked, resulting in an explosion which in-
jured plaintiff. The court in Karle denied strict liability, but there
appears to have been a pleading problem.57 The case is also distin-
51. Id. at 256.
52. 102 A. 617 (R.I. 1918).
53. Id. at 620. Being an "insurer" refers to being'strictly liable for one's actions. See
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 517 (4th ed. 1971). The Rhode Island Supreme Court also denied
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. It appears however, that the court may have
denied res ipsa loquitur at least partly because of the number and significance of "objection-
able" errors in plaintiffs brief.
54. 171 F.2d 670, 674 (8th Cir. 1948).
55. 110 N.W.2d 529 (Minn. 1961).
56. Id. at 538.
57. 448 F.Supp. 753, 767 (W.D. Pa. 1978). Plaintiff argued defendant was liable under
section 402a Restatement Second of Torts for transporting gas in an unreasonably danger-
ous pipeline. To be liable the plaintiff had to plead or prove that the pipeline was unreason-
ably dangerous because of defective manufacture or design. The plaintiff failed to plead or
prove defective manufacture or design. Id. at 767.
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guishable from those discussed above as plaintiffs theory was that
defendant's pipeline was a product unsafe for use rather than ap-
proaching strict liability from the standpoint of natural gas transporta-
tion being an abnormally dangerous activity.5  ,
On the basis of these cases it is evident that United States courts
are not willing to accept the application of strict liability to accidents
relating to the transportation of natural gas. It should be noted, how-
ever, that only one recent case, Karle, supra, has addressed the subject
and in that case there were pleading problems. It is suggested that a
properly pled suit might be successful considering the trend of modem
tort law.
COMMON LAW THEORIES OF LIABILITY IN CANADA
Some of the early Canadian cases are similar in some aspects to
their United States counterparts. For example, Garand v. The Montreal
Light, Heat and Power Company, 9 like S&pple, supra, involved an as-
phyxiation allegedly caused by escaping gas. They both emphasized
the dangerous nature of gas and in each case the defendants were
found liable. Sifple, however, was based on negligence, whereas
Garand took a completely different approach and based liability on
specific language in the charter under which the defendant operated his
system.60
Some Canadian cases of this time period, however, required negli-
gence like their United States counterparts. In Harmer v. Brantford Gas
Company,61 for example, a defendant was installing a main in the
street near the plaintiffs building when an explosion occurred damag-
ing the plaintiffs building. The court stated that "plaintiff must allege
and prove negligence .... '62 The circumstances and allegations, al-
though not clear from the report, were insufficient to find liability. In a
somewhat later Canadian case,63 defendant had a 2 inch gas line in the
58. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs, §§ 519-524A (1977) for a discussion of the
concept of abnormally dangerous activities.
59. 33 Que. C.S. 414 (1908).
60. It is useful to see what is contained in the charter of the defendant with regard to
their responsibility for damages. The statute of Canada, 1847, chap. LXXIX, sec. H, pro-
vides: "That the company, in the exercise of the power conferred upon it... shall indem-
nify the possessor and proprietor of houses and properties for all damages by them
suffered." In I Edward VII, cap. LXVI, sec. 10, it is provided: "That the company may...
construct... pipes... necessary for its business, provided that the company be responsi-
ble for all damages which it may occassion." Id. at 418.
61. 13 O.W.R. 873 (1909).
62. Id. at 878.
63. Employers Liability Co. v. Central Pipe Line Co., 27 Ont. W.N. 1 (1924).
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street in front of plaintiff's house. A new sewer line recently had been
installed under the gas line and the defendent knew of the construction.
Gas leaked out of the gas line and percolated through the soil into the
plaintiff's house where an explosion occurred. In finding the defendant
liable, the court simply noted that "persons undertaking to deal with
[gas] are. . . bound. . . to use all reasonable diligence to prevent an
escape . . . ."' In the pre-1915 Canadian cases the reasonable dili-
gence required was merely a negligence standard which was the same
standard then used in United States courts.
Canadian cases after about 1915 diverge from those in the United
States. Negligence was no longer the main theory used, but liability
was based on a defendant's operating charter or franchise as it was
earlier in Garand, supra. Two examples of later cases basing liability
on a charter or franchise are ?affan v. The Canadian Western Natural
Gas, Light, Heat andPower Company6" and Darbey v. Wnniveg Electric
Company.66
Raffan is especially important because of its interpretation of an
ordinance67 to imply strict liability as in Rylands v. Fletcher, ie., liabil-
ity without proof of negligence. This interpretation comes about
through the phrase "so as not to endanger the public health .... 1)68
The Raffan court states that "[t]he statutory authority invoked by the
company is not absolute, but qualified, and. . . they are legally liable
for all damage. .. 69 within the scope of that authority, here locating
and constructing the gas system. As a justification for this holding the
court states that "[tihe intention of the legislature could not have been
. . . to give a remedy which already existed at common law if the com-
pany were guilty of negligence. The object of the qualifying section
must have been to prevent the company from endangering the public
health or safety in carrying out their undertaking."7 Public health or
safety was then determined to apply to individuals and not just the
public at large as defendant claimed.7 In a concurring opinion the
64. Id. at 2-3 (emphasis added).
65. 8 W.W.R. 676 (1915).
66. [1933] 4 D.L.R. 252.
67. The ordinance reads as follows: "[the company shall locate and construct its gas or
water works or electric or telephone system, and all apparatus and appurtenances thereto
belonging or appertaining or therewith communicating and wheresoever situated so as not
to endanger the public health or safety." 8 W.W.R. 676, 677 (1915).
68. Id. at 678.
69. Id. at 677 (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 677-78.
71. Id. at 678.
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applicability of strict liability is directly stated. "It follows... that the
principle of Rylands v. Fletcher... applies to this case, and that if...
defendants' gas pipes... 'endangered the public health or safety'...
they are liable . ..without proof of negligence ... . 72 The court
does, however, recognize as a defense the fact that the proximate cause
was the voluntary act of a third party.73
It is important to note that the court did not state that gas distribu-
tion was a strict liability activity, but rather that a statute was inter-
preted to impose liability without fault.
Darbey, supra, confirms the use of liberal statutory interpretation
to apply liability without fault to a defendant gas company, although in
the particular factual situation the defendant was not liable. In
Darbey, the plaintiff property owner contracted with defendant gas
company to supply gas to her house. The plaintiff later built an addi-
tion onto her house and damaged some of the defendant's gas pipes
located on plaintiffs. property. Gas escaped into the plaintiffs house
and plaintiff was injured.
The plaintiff contended that the defendant was liable with or with-
out negligence,74 by reason of the statute7" under which defendant op-
erated or under the actual rule of Rylands v. Fletcher, where liability
rested on the escape of a mischievous thing from the owner's prem-
ises.7 6 The Darbey court approvingly reviewed Raffan and stated that
it was on that ground that the case must be decided.77 However,
Darbey also acknowledged the possibility of applying strict liability not
only on the basis of the statute, but also on the actual premise of Ry-
lands v. Fletcher, as the plaintiff had contended. The Darbey court de-
nied defendant's liability on all grounds by recognizing as a defense to
both approaches to strict liability the wrongful acts of third parties,
here the plaintiff.7" Darbey is thus one of the first cases to acknowledge
that a cause of action may exist based not only on statutorily implied
72. Id. at 689.
73. Id.
74. [1933] 4 D.L.R. 252, 255.
75. Act of Incorporation of the Manitoba Electric, Gas and Light Company, 1880 Man.
Stat. c. 86. §§ 25-30. Id. at 254.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 257.
78. "[Defendants] cannot be held liable under Fletcher v. Rylands nor under the special
clause of their Act of Incorporation for the same reason. They... are not responsible for
the act of a stranger which could not be anticipated or suspected, and of which they had no
notice." Id. at 259.
No. 3]
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strict liability, but also on strict liability according to Rylands v. Fetch-
er.
In 1935 a major Canadian decision was handed down. London
Guarantee and Accident Co. v. Northwestern Utlities Ltd 79 involved
the usual cast of characters: gas distribution company, third party, and
nearby property. The defendant's 12 inch gas main developed a leak as
a result of sewer construction by the city. Gas leaked into the basement
of plaintiffs insured's hotel and an explosion and fire resulted. Dam-
ages were claimed in excess of $320,000, a large sum for a depression
era case. The defendant gas company claimed they were not responsi-
ble for and could not control the city's operations.
The major significance of the case lies in the court's succint state-
ment that the carrying of gas is subject to the rule of strict liability if the
gas escapes.
That gas is a dangerous thing within the rules applicable to
things dangerous in themselves is beyond question. Thus the appel-
lants who are carrying in their mains the inflammable and explosive
gas are primafacde within the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher [cita-
tions];. . . though they are doing nothing wrongful in carrying the
dangerous thing so long as they keep it in their pipes, they come
primafacie within the rule of strict liability if the gas escapes; the gas
constitutes an extraordinary danger created by the appellants for
their own purposes, and the rule established by Rylands v. Fletcher
...requires that they act at their peril and must pay for damage
caused by the gas if it escapes, even without any negligence on their
part. The rule is not limited to cases where the defendant has been
carrying or accumulating the dangerous thing on his own land; it
applies equally in a case like the present where appellants were car-
rying the gas in mains laid in the property of the city ... in exercise
of a franchise to do so. . .[citations]. 80
This case also involved the provisions of The Water, Gas, Electric,
and Telephone Companies Act of Alberta.8' The court avoided deter-
mining whether this statute itself applied an absolute duty on defend-
ant by interpreting the defendant's acts as maintenance which was
outside the scope of the act.82 The court did note, however, that "where
79. [1935] 3 W.W.R. 446.
80. Id. at 450-51.
81. ALTA. REV. STAT. 1922, 1924c. 168, as amended by Alta. Stat. c. 3, § 21. Id, at.
82. Id. at 448. Section 11 stated: 'The Company shall make satisfaction to the owners
or proprietors of any building or other property or to the municipality or Minister of Public
Works as the case may be for all damages caused in or by the execution of all or any of the
said powers."' Section 13 stated: 'The company shall locate and construct its gas or water or
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[gas companies] are acting under statutory powers it is a question of
construction. . . of the statute whether they are only liable for negli-
gence or whether they remain subject to the strict and unqualified rule
of Rylands v. Fletcher."' 3
Another major aspect of the case is the court's discussion of de-
fenses available to the defendant even when strict liability is applied.
The first of these defenses might be called the statutory powers defense.
On this subject the court stated "the rule of strict liability has been
modified by admitting as a defense that what was being done was prop-
erly done in pursuance of statutory powers, and the mischief that has
happened has not been brought about by any negligence on the part of
the [gas company]." 4 Another defense accepted by the court is that
damage was caused by the volitional independent act of a third party:
"the rule of [strict liability] has been held inapplicable where the casu-
alty is due to the act of God; or to the independent or conscious voli-
tion of a third party . . and not to any negligence of the
defendants." 5 A third defense which London Guarantee considered
and which the court rejected was the common interest defense.8 6 The
court recognized that the defense might be acceptable in some situa-
tions, but that in the case before the court it was inapplicable since the
defendant was engaged in a commercial undertaking and the plaintiff
was merely availing himself of the service offered. 7
The court in London Guarantee accepted the defendant's defense
against strict liability, that the accident had resulted from the volitional
act of a third party." However, the court proceeded to consider
whether the defendant was negligent for failing to foresee and guard
electric or telephone system and all apparatus and appurtenances thereto belonging or ap-
pertaining or therewith connected and wheresoever situated so as not to endanger the public
health or safety." Id. (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 452.
84. Id. at 451. For a general discussion of defenses to strict liability see PROSSmE, LAW
OF TORTS 523 (4th ed. 1971).
85. Id. at451.
86. Id. at 452. See note 87 infra.
87. The court stated: "Reference was made to a further possible defense based on the
contention that the appellants and the owners of the properties destroyed had a common
interest in maintaining the potentially dangerous installation, or that these owners had con-
sented to the danger. It is true that in proper cases such may be good defenses, but they do
not seem to have any application to a case like the present where the appellants are a com-
mercial undertaking though no doubt they are acting under statutory powers, while those
whose property has been destroyed are merely individual consumers who avail themselves
of the supply of gas which is offered. These facts do not constitute a common interest or
consent in any relevant sense." Id.
88. Id. at 454-56.
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against the consequences of the third party's acts.89 In considering neg-
ligence the court noted that "[t]he degree of care. . must be propor-
tioned to the degree of risk .... 90 The court also mentioned the
"tremendous responsibility of carrying this highly inflammable gas"9'
and in finding the defendant liable in negligence noted that "[i]f they
did not know of the city works, their system of inspection must have
been very deficient. If they did know they should have been on their
guard .... ,92 Thus, when the court couldn't use strict liability, it re-
sorted to negligence with a variable standard of care as used in United
States courts.
One additional case which is important in the development of Ca-
nadian common law is Snyder v. Moncton Electricity & Gas.93 There,
an explosion in the plaintiffs house allegedly was caused by leaking gas
which migrated through the soil into the plaintiff's house. The main
importance of Snyder, supra, lies in the gloss it adds to London Guaran-
tee, supra, concerning statutory interpretation. The Snyder court con-
cluded that when a statute is involved the court must examine the
statute to see if there are "qualifying provisions imposing special liabil-
ity."94 In the absence of these provisions, acting within statutory pow-
ers is a defense to strict liability imposed as a result of the gas being a
dangerous thing within the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher.
Recent cases follow London Guarantee. In Weisler v. District of
North Vancouver95 the municipality disturbed co-defendant gas com-
pany's main and gas leaked into plaintiff's supper club where an explo-
sion occurred. The court followed London Guarantee, allowing the
actions within statutory powers defense, and then applying negligence
with a high standard of care.96 The court noted in conclusion that on
the basis of London Guarantee the defendant was liable.97
Similarly, London Guarantee was followed in the most recent per-
tinent case, Fenn v. Corporation of the City of Peterborough.9 Fenn
involved a factual situation almost identical to that in London Guaran-
tee. A fracture in a gas line in the street in front of plaintiff's house
89. Id.
90. Id. at 458.
91. Id. at 459.
92. Id.
93. [1936] 2 D.L.R. 31.
94. Id. at 34.
95. 17 D.L.R.2d 319 (1959).
96. Id. at 325-27.
97. Id. at 329.
98. 73 D.L.R. 3d 177, 14 Ont.2d 137, 1 C.C.L.T. 90 (1976).
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apparently was caused by a water line repair crew which replaced a
defective water line in the area near the gas line. The gas allegedly
leaked from the fracture and percolated through the soil into the plain-
tiff's basement where an explosion occurred killing several persons.
The Fenn court noted the applicability of the principles of London
Guarantee, sora,99 and when the defendant relied on the third party
defense" ° to strict liability, the court stated that the defendant might
still be liable in negligence.101 In discussing the "tremendouse""3 re-
sponsibility of a party carrying gas it was noted that "the Gas Com-
pany should have had in mind at all times the danger. . . [of working
with gas and].. . the tremendous responsibility that rested upon them
to. . . ensure that there be no escape of gas .... 3 The standard of
care as delineated in London Guarantee was then used by the court and
the defendant was found liable."°4
Thus, London Guarantee and recent cases hold that those who
carry gas are ' primafacie within the rule of strict liability if the gas
escapes." ' There are, however, two defenses which have been recog-
nized: that the damage was caused by the "independent or conscious
volition of a third party"'' 6 or that the company was acting within their
statutory powers.107 The second defense depends on the construction
of the language of the statute and according to Snyder, unless there are
"qualifying provisions imposing special liability"'10 8 the defense is valid
and the plaintiff must show negligence. According to London Guaran-
tee the plaintiff must likewise show negligence if the third party de-
fense is valid."w The common interest defense, at least within the
London Guarantee factual situation, is not valid." 0 When resort to
negligence is necessary, London Guarantee establishes and recent cases
agree, that the degree of care must be proportionate to the risk and that
the risk of carrying gas is high."1 The result of this reasoning is invari-
99. Id. at 186.
100. See notes 84-87 and accompanying text, supra.
101. See 73 D.L.R. 3d 177, 14 OnL2d 137, 1 C.C.L.T. 90 (1976).
102. Id. at 189.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 188.
105. [1935] 4 D.L.R. 737, 741, 3 W.W.R. 446, 451.
106. Id. at 742.
107. Id.
108. [1936] 2 D.L.R. 31, 34.
109. [1935] 4 D.L.R. 737, 747, 3 W.W.R. 446, 457.
110. See note 87 and accompanying text supra.
111. [1935] 4 D.L.R. 737, 748, 3 W.W.R. 446, 458.
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ably the establishment of a high standard of care which frequently
leads to finding the defendant liable.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The early Canadian common law recognized the dangerous nature
of gas"12 and some of the early cases required proof of negligence. 1 3
Further development on the Canadian common law, however, pro-
vided for judicial construction of charters and franchises and resulted
in holding defendants strictly liable for their actions.' 14 The main de-
fense available was that the damage resulted from the independent vo-
litional act of a third party." 5 Early United States cases developed
along a different line.' 6 The dangerous nature of gas was recognized
quickly by the United States courts" 7 as it had been by the Canadian
courts. However, while the Canadian courts used charters or franchises
as a means of finding strict liability, the United States courts used neg-
ligence, but adjusted the standard of care to suit the hazardous nature
of gas.
The Canadian common law after about 1935 continued to empha-
size strict liability. The basis of strict liability, however, shifted away
from the charters and franchises as a result of the courts acknowledging
that gas transportation was a strict liability activity within the concept
of RJylands v. Fletcher. Along with this acknowledgement came the rec-
ognition of the defenses of acting within statutory powers and in-
dependent volitional acts of third parties. Where one of these defenses
was allowed, a negligence standard with a high standard of care was
applied. Since these defenses were frequently allowed, the negligence
standard was the usual measure of liability. During this transitional
period in the Canadian common law when the basis for strict liability
was being redefined, the United States common law continued to use a
negligence standard with an adjustable, but usually high standard of
care.
Today, this distinction still exists with Canadian courts using strict
liability as discussed above and United States courts using the negli-
gence standard with an adjustable standard of care.
Thus, where a Canadian defendant gas transmission operator has
112. See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
113. See notes 61 and 62 and accompanying text supra.
114. See notes 65-78 and accompanying text supra.
115. See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
116. See notes 29-41 and 43-51 and accompanying text supra.
117. See notes 38-42 and accompanying text supra.
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the valid defense of the damage having resulted from the independent
volitional acts of a third party or that it was acting within statutory
powers, negligence will be the applicable theory of liability. Similarly,
negligence will be the applicable theory of liability for a defendant lo-
cated in the United States if the incident is not on Federal lands. If the
United States incident is on Federal lands and is within the regulations
promulgated under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920,"'" as amended, or
if the Canadian defendant cannot avail itself of one of the defenses, the
applicable theory of liability will again be similar, but will be strict
liability.
118. 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1976 & Supp. I 1978). The regulations promulgated under this act
are at 44 Fed. Reg. 58, 126 (1979) (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. 2880 eltseq.). See aro, notes
5-15 and accompanying text supra.
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